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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -

1957

rightness or wrongness about these views. They simply represent a dispute which has existed for many years before and ever since the classic
5
Palsgraf Case.1
Finally, a take-your-choice result was reached by the Supreme Court
in Clinger v. Duncan.16 The defendant driver had stepped out of the
driver's seat of a two door automobile to allow passengers to enter. She
left the motor running and the hand brake released. The plaintiff was
preparing to enter the back seat on the right side. The remaining passenger in the front seat moved to her left to facilitate plaintiff's entry,
and in the process she hit the transmission lever into reverse. The car
moved suddenly backward striking both plaintiff and defendant to the
ground. The startled passenger compounded her confusion and moved
the lever to the forward position so that plaintiff was struck again. The
majority held that the guest statute did not apply because plaintiff was
not "in or upon such vehicle" at the time of the accident. Accordingly
defendant was found liable for negligence. The dissent felt that plaintiff's partial entry should be enough to bring her within the guest statute,
or at least that the jury should be allowed to resolve that particular
dispute.
WALTER PROBERT

TRADE REGULATION
Two Ohio decisions, one in the field of resale price fixing, and the
other in the field of unfair competition, deserve comment.
In the Survey of Ohio Law for 19551 the first Ohio decision applying
the nonsigner provisions of the Ohio Fair Trade Act, 2 received comment.
This trial court3 granted an injunction against the nonsigner defendant's
selling a fair traded commodity at less than the minimum resale price
fixed in a contract with an. Ohio retailer. The court of appeals, following an appeal on questions of law, granted a permanent injunction almost
identical with that previously granted in the Court of Common Pleas of
Lake County. On appeal on the merits, the Supreme Court in Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair,Inc 4 reversed the judgment below with instructions to dissolve the injunction.
This decision held the nonsigner provision of the Ohio Fair Trade
Act5 to -beunconstitutional. The court did not pass upon the validity of
any other provisions of the Ohio law.
14101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955).
'Palsgraf

v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

' 166 Ohio St 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[June

The majority opinion states that section 1333.07, Revised Code, is
invalid for three reasons:
1. As applied to nonsigners, the prohibition of the statute constitutes an unauthorized exercise of the police power because there is no
substantial relation to the public safety, morals or general welfare;
2. The statute violates the due process clause of the Ohio Bill of
Rights by its arbitrary and monopolistic denial to a nonsigning seller of
his privilege of disposing of his own property on terms of his own choice;
3. The statute delegates legislative power and discretion to private
6
persons.
Ohio now joins the growing number of state courts which have either
held their entire fair trade acts unconstitutional or at least have refused
to apply them to nonsigners. During 1956 and 1957 the Supreme Courts
of the following states rendered similar decisions: Arizona, Colorado,
Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah.T
United Electric Fixture and Supply Co. v. United Electric Supply Co.8
involved alleged unfair competition by a defendant through the use of a
similar corporate name. The case emphasizes the importance of the burden of proof upon the complainant to show confusion or the probability
of confusion resulting in the sustaining of damage, or the probability of
substantial damage from the continued use of a similar name. An incorporated wholesaler and retailer of electrical supplies brought an action to
enjoin a wholesaler of electrical supplies operating in Cuyahoga County
from doing business under a similar name. The defendant was doing
business on Euclid Avenue at least two miles from the plaintiff's place
of business in the downtown Cleveland area. The trial court found that
17 WEST. RES. L. REv. 343 (1956).
20OO REV. CODE §§ 1333.05-.10.
'Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 130 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio C.
P. 1955).
' 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958). While this case was decided in January, 1958, an exception to the normal rule of reporting only cases appearing in the
Northeastern Reporter during the calendar year 1957 has been made because of the
timeliness of this decision which deserves immediate comment without postponement
until 1959.
"OHIO REv. CODE § 1333.07.

'In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 16) Ohio St. 182, 147
N.E.2d 481 (1958), Taft, J., in a concurring opinion expressed the view that there
was in fact in this case no evidence of a binding contract with an Ohio retailer within
the meaning of OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1333.06-.07, and that there was obviously no
basis for the injunction authorized by OHIO REV. CODE § 1333.08.
"The decisions from other jurisdictions are collected in 1 CCH TAADE REG. REP. S
3258, pp. 4666, 4945, 4966 (1957).
"United Electric Fixture and Supply Co. v. United Electric Supply Company, 140
N.E.2d 340 (Ohio C.P. 1956).

